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  1. Frameworks
  2. >ATTACK
  3. >Collection
  4. >ATTACK-T1119
ATTACK-T1119Active

Automated Collection

Statement

Once established within a system or network, an adversary may use automated techniques for collecting internal data. Methods for performing this technique could include use of a Command and Scripting Interpreter to search for and copy information fitting set criteria such as file type, location, or name at specific time intervals.

In cloud-based environments, adversaries may also use cloud APIs, data pipelines, command line interfaces, or extract, transform, and load (ETL) services to automatically collect data.(Citation: Mandiant UNC3944 SMS Phishing 2023)

This functionality could also be built into remote access tools.

This technique may incorporate use of other techniques such as File and Directory Discovery and Lateral Tool Transfer to identify and move files, as well as Cloud Service Dashboard and Cloud Storage Object Discovery to identify resources in cloud environments.

Location

Tactic
Collection

Technique Details

Identifier
ATTACK-T1119
ATT&CK Page
View on MITRE

Tactics

Collection

Platforms

IaaSLinuxmacOSOffice SuiteSaaSWindows

Detection

Automated File and API Collection Detection Across Platforms

Mitigations

Remote Data Storage: Remote Data Storage focuses on moving critical data, such as security logs and sensitive files, to secure, off-host locations to minimize unauthorized access, tampering, or destruction by adversaries. By leveraging remote storage solutions, organizations enhance the protection of forensic evidence, sensitive information, and monitoring data. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:

Centralized Log Management:

  • Configure endpoints to forward security logs to a centralized log collector or SIEM.
  • Use tools like Splunk Graylog, or Security Onion to aggregate and store logs.
  • Example command (Linux): sudo auditd | tee /var/log/audit/audit.log | nc <remote-log-server> 514

Remote File Storage Solutions:

  • Utilize cloud storage solutions like AWS S3, Google Cloud Storage, or Azure Blob Storage for sensitive data.
  • Ensure proper encryption at rest and access control policies (IAM roles, ACLs).

Intrusion Detection Log Forwarding:

  • Forward logs from IDS/IPS systems (e.g., Zeek/Suricata) to a remote security information system.
  • Example for Suricata log forwarding: `outputs:
    • type: syslog protocol: tls address: <remote-syslog-server>`

Immutable Backup Configurations:

  • Enable immutable storage settings for backups to prevent adversaries from modifying or deleting data.
  • Example: AWS S3 Object Lock.

Data Encryption:

  • Ensure encryption for sensitive data using AES-256 at rest and TLS 1.2+ for data in transit. Tools: OpenSSL, BitLocker, LUKS for Linux.

Encrypt Sensitive Information: Protect sensitive information at rest, in transit, and during processing by using strong encryption algorithms. Encryption ensures the confidentiality and integrity of data, preventing unauthorized access or tampering. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:

Encrypt Data at Rest:

  • Use Case: Use full-disk encryption or file-level encryption to secure sensitive data stored on devices.
  • Implementation: Implement BitLocker for Windows systems or FileVault for macOS devices to encrypt hard drives.

Encrypt Data in Transit:

  • Use Case: Use secure communication protocols (e.g., TLS, HTTPS) to encrypt sensitive data as it travels over networks.
  • Implementation: Enable HTTPS for all web applications and configure mail servers to enforce STARTTLS for email encryption.

Encrypt Backups:

  • Use Case: Ensure that backup data is encrypted both during storage and transfer to prevent unauthorized access.
  • Implementation: Encrypt cloud backups using AES-256 before uploading them to Amazon S3 or Google Cloud.

Encrypt Application Secrets:

  • Use Case: Store sensitive credentials, API keys, and configuration files in encrypted vaults.
  • Implementation: Use HashiCorp Vault or AWS Secrets Manager to manage and encrypt secrets.

Database Encryption:

  • Use Case: Enable Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) or column-level encryption in database management systems.
  • Implementation: Use MySQL’s built-in encryption features to encrypt sensitive database fields such as social security numbers.
SP 800-53
SP800-53-AC-16relatedvia ctid-attack-to-sp800-53
SP800-53-AC-17relatedvia ctid-attack-to-sp800-53
SP800-53-AC-18relatedvia ctid-attack-to-sp800-53
SP800-53-AC-19relatedvia ctid-attack-to-sp800-53
SP800-53-AC-20relatedvia ctid-attack-to-sp800-53
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Collection36 controls
ATTACK-T1005Data from Local SystemATTACK-T1025Data from Removable MediaATTACK-T1039Data from Network Shared DriveATTACK-T1056Input CaptureATTACK-T1056.001KeyloggingATTACK-T1056.002GUI Input CaptureATTACK-T1056.003Web Portal CaptureATTACK-T1056.004Credential API HookingATTACK-T1074Data StagedATTACK-T1074.001Local Data StagingATTACK-T1074.002Remote Data StagingATTACK-T1113Screen CaptureATTACK-T1114Email CollectionATTACK-T1114.001Local Email CollectionATTACK-T1114.002Remote Email CollectionATTACK-T1114.003Email Forwarding RuleATTACK-T1115Clipboard DataATTACK-T1119Automated CollectionATTACK-T1123Audio CaptureATTACK-T1125Video CaptureATTACK-T1185Browser Session HijackingATTACK-T1213Data from Information RepositoriesATTACK-T1213.001ConfluenceATTACK-T1213.002SharepointATTACK-T1213.003Code RepositoriesATTACK-T1213.004Customer Relationship Management SoftwareATTACK-T1213.005Messaging ApplicationsATTACK-T1213.006DatabasesATTACK-T1530Data from Cloud StorageATTACK-T1560Archive Collected DataATTACK-T1560.001Archive via UtilityATTACK-T1560.002Archive via LibraryATTACK-T1560.003Archive via Custom MethodATTACK-T1602Data from Configuration RepositoryATTACK-T1602.001SNMP (MIB Dump)ATTACK-T1602.002Network Device Configuration Dump