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  1. Frameworks
  2. >ATTACK
  3. >Command And Control
  4. >ATTACK-T1090.004
ATTACK-T1090.004Active

Domain Fronting

Statement

Adversaries may take advantage of routing schemes in Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) and other services which host multiple domains to obfuscate the intended destination of HTTPS traffic or traffic tunneled through HTTPS. (Citation: Fifield Blocking Resistent Communication through domain fronting 2015) Domain fronting involves using different domain names in the SNI field of the TLS header and the Host field of the HTTP header. If both domains are served from the same CDN, then the CDN may route to the address specified in the HTTP header after unwrapping the TLS header. A variation of the the technique, "domainless" fronting, utilizes a SNI field that is left blank; this may allow the fronting to work even when the CDN attempts to validate that the SNI and HTTP Host fields match (if the blank SNI fields are ignored).

For example, if domain-x and domain-y are customers of the same CDN, it is possible to place domain-x in the TLS header and domain-y in the HTTP header. Traffic will appear to be going to domain-x, however the CDN may route it to domain-y.

Location

Tactic
Command and Control

Technique Details

Identifier
ATTACK-T1090.004
Parent Technique
ATTACK-T1090
ATT&CK Page
View on MITRE

Tactics

Command And Control

Platforms

LinuxmacOSWindowsESXi

Detection

Domain Fronting Behavior via Mismatched TLS SNI and HTTP Host Headers

Mitigations

SSL/TLS Inspection: SSL/TLS inspection involves decrypting encrypted network traffic to examine its content for signs of malicious activity. This capability is crucial for detecting threats that use encryption to evade detection, such as phishing, malware, or data exfiltration. After inspection, the traffic is re-encrypted and forwarded to its destination. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:

Deploy SSL/TLS Inspection Appliances:

  • Implement SSL/TLS inspection solutions to decrypt and inspect encrypted traffic.
  • Ensure appliances are placed at critical network choke points for maximum coverage.

Configure Decryption Policies:

  • Define rules to decrypt traffic for specific applications, ports, or domains.
  • Avoid decrypting sensitive or privacy-related traffic, such as financial or healthcare websites, to comply with regulations.

Integrate Threat Intelligence:

  • Use threat intelligence feeds to correlate inspected traffic with known indicators of compromise (IOCs).

Integrate with Security Tools:

  • Combine SSL/TLS inspection with SIEM and NDR tools to analyze decrypted traffic and generate alerts for suspicious activity.
  • Example Tools: Splunk, Darktrace

Implement Certificate Management:

  • Use trusted internal or third-party certificates for traffic re-encryption after inspection.
  • Regularly update certificate authorities (CAs) to ensure secure re-encryption.

Monitor and Tune:

  • Continuously monitor SSL/TLS inspection logs for anomalies and fine-tune policies to reduce false positives.
SP 800-53
SP800-53-SC-8relatedvia ctid-attack-to-sp800-53
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Command and Control41 controls
ATTACK-T1001Data ObfuscationATTACK-T1001.001Junk DataATTACK-T1001.002SteganographyATTACK-T1001.003Protocol or Service ImpersonationATTACK-T1008Fallback ChannelsATTACK-T1071Application Layer ProtocolATTACK-T1071.001Web ProtocolsATTACK-T1071.002File Transfer ProtocolsATTACK-T1071.003Mail ProtocolsATTACK-T1071.004DNSATTACK-T1071.005Publish/Subscribe ProtocolsATTACK-T1090ProxyATTACK-T1090.001Internal ProxyATTACK-T1090.002External ProxyATTACK-T1090.003Multi-hop ProxyATTACK-T1090.004Domain FrontingATTACK-T1092Communication Through Removable MediaATTACK-T1095Non-Application Layer ProtocolATTACK-T1102Web ServiceATTACK-T1102.001Dead Drop ResolverATTACK-T1102.002Bidirectional CommunicationATTACK-T1102.003One-Way CommunicationATTACK-T1104Multi-Stage ChannelsATTACK-T1105Ingress Tool TransferATTACK-T1132Data EncodingATTACK-T1132.001Standard EncodingATTACK-T1132.002Non-Standard EncodingATTACK-T1219Remote Access ToolsATTACK-T1219.001IDE TunnelingATTACK-T1219.002Remote Desktop SoftwareATTACK-T1219.003Remote Access HardwareATTACK-T1568Dynamic ResolutionATTACK-T1568.001Fast Flux DNSATTACK-T1568.002Domain Generation AlgorithmsATTACK-T1568.003DNS CalculationATTACK-T1571Non-Standard PortATTACK-T1572Protocol TunnelingATTACK-T1573Encrypted ChannelATTACK-T1573.001Symmetric CryptographyATTACK-T1573.002Asymmetric CryptographyATTACK-T1665Hide Infrastructure