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Privacy PolicyTerms of Service
  1. Frameworks
  2. >ATTACK
  3. >Persistence
  4. >ATTACK-T1098.001
ATTACK-T1098.001Active

Additional Cloud Credentials

Statement

Adversaries may add adversary-controlled credentials to a cloud account to maintain persistent access to victim accounts and instances within the environment.

For example, adversaries may add credentials for Service Principals and Applications in addition to existing legitimate credentials in Azure / Entra ID.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance)(Citation: Blue Cloud of Death)(Citation: Blue Cloud of Death Video) These credentials include both x509 keys and passwords.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance) With sufficient permissions, there are a variety of ways to add credentials including the Azure Portal, Azure command line interface, and Azure or Az PowerShell modules.(Citation: Demystifying Azure AD Service Principals)

In infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) environments, after gaining access through Cloud Accounts, adversaries may generate or import their own SSH keys using either the <code>CreateKeyPair</code> or <code>ImportKeyPair</code> API in AWS or the <code>gcloud compute os-login ssh-keys add</code> command in GCP.(Citation: GCP SSH Key Add) This allows persistent access to instances within the cloud environment without further usage of the compromised cloud accounts.(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS)(Citation: Expel Behind the Scenes)

Adversaries may also use the <code>CreateAccessKey</code> API in AWS or the <code>gcloud iam service-accounts keys create</code> command in GCP to add access keys to an account. Alternatively, they may use the <code>CreateLoginProfile</code> API in AWS to add a password that can be used to log into the AWS Management Console for Cloud Service Dashboard.(Citation: Permiso Scattered Spider 2023)(Citation: Lacework AI Resource Hijacking 2024) If the target account has different permissions from the requesting account, the adversary may also be able to escalate their privileges in the environment (i.e. Cloud Accounts).(Citation: Rhino Security Labs AWS Privilege Escalation)(Citation: Sysdig ScarletEel 2.0) For example, in Entra ID environments, an adversary with the Application Administrator role can add a new set of credentials to their application's service principal. In doing so the adversary would be able to access the service principal’s roles and permissions, which may be different from those of the Application Administrator.(Citation: SpecterOps Azure Privilege Escalation)

In AWS environments, adversaries with the appropriate permissions may also use the sts:GetFederationToken API call to create a temporary set of credentials to Forge Web Credentials tied to the permissions of the original user account. These temporary credentials may remain valid for the duration of their lifetime even if the original account’s API credentials are deactivated. (Citation: Crowdstrike AWS User Federation Persistence)

In Entra ID environments with the app password feature enabled, adversaries may be able to add an app password to a user account.(Citation: Mandiant APT42 Operations 2024) As app passwords are intended to be used with legacy devices that do not support multi-factor authentication (MFA), adding an app password can allow an adversary to bypass MFA requirements. Additionally, app passwords may remain valid even if the user’s primary password is reset.(Citation: Microsoft Entra ID App Passwords)

Location

Tactic
Persistence

Technique Details

Identifier
ATTACK-T1098.001
Parent Technique
ATTACK-T1098
ATT&CK Page
View on MITRE

Tactics

PersistencePrivilege Escalation

Platforms

IaaSIdentity ProviderSaaS

Detection

Detection Strategy for Additional Cloud Credentials in IaaS/IdP/SaaS

Mitigations

Multi-factor Authentication: Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) enhances security by requiring users to provide at least two forms of verification to prove their identity before granting access. These factors typically include:

  • Something you know: Passwords, PINs.
  • Something you have: Physical tokens, smartphone authenticator apps.
  • Something you are: Biometric data such as fingerprints, facial recognition, or retinal scans.

Implementing MFA across all critical systems and services ensures robust protection against account takeover and unauthorized access. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:

Identity and Access Management (IAM):

  • Use IAM solutions like Azure Active Directory, Okta, or AWS IAM to enforce MFA policies for all user logins, especially for privileged roles.
  • Enable conditional access policies to enforce MFA for risky sign-ins (e.g., unfamiliar devices, geolocations).
  • Enable Conditional Access policies to only allow logins from trusted devices, such as those enrolled in Intune or joined via Hybrid/Entra.

Authentication Tools and Methods:

  • Use authenticator applications such as Google Authenticator, Microsoft Authenticator, or Authy for time-based one-time passwords (TOTP).
  • Deploy hardware-based tokens like YubiKey, RSA SecurID, or smart cards for additional security.
  • Enforce biometric authentication for compatible devices and applications.

Secure Legacy Systems:

  • Integrate MFA solutions with older systems using third-party tools like Duo Security or Thales SafeNet.
  • Enable RADIUS/NPS servers to facilitate MFA for VPNs, RDP, and other network logins.

Monitoring and Alerting:

  • Use SIEM tools to monitor failed MFA attempts, login anomalies, or brute-force attempts against MFA systems.
  • Implement alerts for suspicious MFA activities, such as repeated failed codes or new device registrations.

Training and Policy Enforcement:

  • Educate employees on the importance of MFA and secure authenticator usage.
  • Enforce policies that require MFA on all critical systems, especially for remote access, privileged accounts, and cloud applications.

User Account Management: User Account Management involves implementing and enforcing policies for the lifecycle of user accounts, including creation, modification, and deactivation. Proper account management reduces the attack surface by limiting unauthorized access, managing account privileges, and ensuring accounts are used according to organizational policies. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:

Enforcing the Principle of Least Privilege

  • Implementation: Assign users only the minimum permissions required to perform their job functions. Regularly audit accounts to ensure no excess permissions are granted.
  • Use Case: Reduces the risk of privilege escalation by ensuring accounts cannot perform unauthorized actions.

Implementing Strong Password Policies

  • Implementation: Enforce password complexity requirements (e.g., length, character types). Require password expiration every 90 days and disallow password reuse.
  • Use Case: Prevents adversaries from gaining unauthorized access through password guessing or brute force attacks.

Managing Dormant and Orphaned Accounts

  • Implementation: Implement automated workflows to disable accounts after a set period of inactivity (e.g., 30 days). Remove orphaned accounts (e.g., accounts without an assigned owner) during regular account audits.
  • Use Case: Eliminates dormant accounts that could be exploited by attackers.

Account Lockout Policies

  • Implementation: Configure account lockout thresholds (e.g., lock accounts after five failed login attempts). Set lockout durations to a minimum of 15 minutes.
  • Use Case: Mitigates automated attack techniques that rely on repeated login attempts.

Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) for High-Risk Accounts

  • Implementation: Require MFA for all administrative accounts and high-risk users. Use MFA mechanisms like hardware tokens, authenticator apps, or biometrics.
  • Use Case: Prevents unauthorized access, even if credentials are stolen.

Restricting Interactive Logins

  • Implementation: Restrict interactive logins for privileged accounts to specific secure systems or management consoles. Use group policies to enforce logon restrictions.
  • Use Case: Protects sensitive accounts from misuse or exploitation.

Tools for Implementation

Built-in Tools:

  • Microsoft Active Directory (AD): Centralized account management and RBAC enforcement.
  • Group Policy Object (GPO): Enforce password policies, logon restrictions, and account lockout policies.

Identity and Access Management (IAM) Tools:

  • Okta: Centralized user provisioning, MFA, and SSO integration.
  • Microsoft Azure Active Directory: Provides advanced account lifecycle management, role-based access, and conditional access policies.

Privileged Account Management (PAM):

  • CyberArk, BeyondTrust, Thycotic: Manage and monitor privileged account usage, enforce session recording, and JIT access.

Network Segmentation: Network segmentation involves dividing a network into smaller, isolated segments to control and limit the flow of traffic between devices, systems, and applications. By segmenting networks, organizations can reduce the attack surface, restrict lateral movement by adversaries, and protect critical assets from compromise.

Effective network segmentation leverages a combination of physical boundaries, logical separation through VLANs, and access control policies enforced by network appliances like firewalls, routers, and cloud-based configurations. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:

Segment Critical Systems:

  • Identify and group systems based on their function, sensitivity, and risk. Examples include payment systems, HR databases, production systems, and internet-facing servers.
  • Use VLANs, firewalls, or routers to enforce logical separation.

Implement DMZ for Public-Facing Services:

  • Host web servers, DNS servers, and email servers in a DMZ to limit their access to internal systems.
  • Apply strict firewall rules to filter traffic between the DMZ and internal networks.

Use Cloud-Based Segmentation:

  • In cloud environments, use VPCs, subnets, and security groups to isolate applications and enforce traffic rules.
  • Apply AWS Transit Gateway or Azure VNet peering for controlled connectivity between cloud segments.

Apply Microsegmentation for Workloads:

  • Use software-defined networking (SDN) tools to implement workload-level segmentation and prevent lateral movement.

Restrict Traffic with ACLs and Firewalls:

  • Apply Access Control Lists (ACLs) to network devices to enforce "deny by default" policies.
  • Use firewalls to restrict both north-south (external-internal) and east-west (internal-internal) traffic.

Monitor and Audit Segmented Networks:

  • Regularly review firewall rules, ACLs, and segmentation policies.
  • Monitor network flows for anomalies to ensure segmentation is effective.

Test Segmentation Effectiveness:

  • Perform periodic penetration tests to verify that unauthorized access is blocked between network segments.

Privileged Account Management: Privileged Account Management focuses on implementing policies, controls, and tools to securely manage privileged accounts (e.g., SYSTEM, root, or administrative accounts). This includes restricting access, limiting the scope of permissions, monitoring privileged account usage, and ensuring accountability through logging and auditing.This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:

Account Permissions and Roles:

  • Implement RBAC and least privilege principles to allocate permissions securely.
  • Use tools like Active Directory Group Policies to enforce access restrictions.

Credential Security:

  • Deploy password vaulting tools like CyberArk, HashiCorp Vault, or KeePass for secure storage and rotation of credentials.
  • Enforce password policies for complexity, uniqueness, and expiration using tools like Microsoft Group Policy Objects (GPO).

Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA):

  • Enforce MFA for all privileged accounts using Duo Security, Okta, or Microsoft Azure AD MFA.

Privileged Access Management (PAM):

  • Use PAM solutions like CyberArk, BeyondTrust, or Thycotic to manage, monitor, and audit privileged access.

Auditing and Monitoring:

  • Integrate activity monitoring into your SIEM (e.g., Splunk or QRadar) to detect and alert on anomalous privileged account usage.

Just-In-Time Access:

  • Deploy JIT solutions like Azure Privileged Identity Management (PIM) or configure ephemeral roles in AWS and GCP to grant time-limited elevated permissions.

Tools for Implementation

Privileged Access Management (PAM):

  • CyberArk, BeyondTrust, Thycotic, HashiCorp Vault.

Credential Management:

  • Microsoft LAPS (Local Admin Password Solution), Password Safe, HashiCorp Vault, KeePass.

Multi-Factor Authentication:

  • Duo Security, Okta, Microsoft Azure MFA, Google Authenticator.

Linux Privilege Management:

  • sudo configuration, SELinux, AppArmor.

Just-In-Time Access:

  • Azure Privileged Identity Management (PIM), AWS IAM Roles with session constraints, GCP Identity-Aware Proxy.

Disable or Remove Feature or Program: Disable or remove unnecessary and potentially vulnerable software, features, or services to reduce the attack surface and prevent abuse by adversaries. This involves identifying software or features that are no longer needed or that could be exploited and ensuring they are either removed or properly disabled. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:

Remove Legacy Software:

  • Use Case: Disable or remove older versions of software that no longer receive updates or security patches (e.g., legacy Java, Adobe Flash).
  • Implementation: A company removes Flash Player from all employee systems after it has reached its end-of-life date.

Disable Unused Features:

  • Use Case: Turn off unnecessary operating system features like SMBv1, Telnet, or RDP if they are not required.
  • Implementation: Disable SMBv1 in a Windows environment to mitigate vulnerabilities like EternalBlue.

Control Applications Installed by Users:

  • Use Case: Prevent users from installing unauthorized software via group policies or other management tools.
  • Implementation: Block user installations of unauthorized file-sharing applications (e.g., BitTorrent clients) in an enterprise environment.

Remove Unnecessary Services:

  • Use Case: Identify and disable unnecessary default services running on endpoints, servers, or network devices.
  • Implementation: Disable unused administrative shares (e.g., C$, ADMIN$) on workstations.

Restrict Add-ons and Plugins:

  • Use Case: Remove or disable browser plugins and add-ons that are not needed for business purposes.
  • Implementation: Disable Java and ActiveX plugins in web browsers to prevent drive-by attacks.
SP 800-53
SP800-53-AC-2relatedvia ctid-attack-to-sp800-53
SP800-53-AC-20relatedvia ctid-attack-to-sp800-53
SP800-53-AC-3relatedvia ctid-attack-to-sp800-53
SP800-53-AC-4relatedvia ctid-attack-to-sp800-53
SP800-53-AC-5relatedvia ctid-attack-to-sp800-53
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Persistence80 controls
ATTACK-T1037Boot or Logon Initialization ScriptsATTACK-T1037.001Logon Script (Windows)ATTACK-T1037.002Login HookATTACK-T1037.003Network Logon ScriptATTACK-T1037.004RC ScriptsATTACK-T1037.005Startup ItemsATTACK-T1098Account ManipulationATTACK-T1098.001Additional Cloud CredentialsATTACK-T1098.002Additional Email Delegate PermissionsATTACK-T1098.003Additional Cloud RolesATTACK-T1098.004SSH Authorized KeysATTACK-T1098.005Device RegistrationATTACK-T1098.006Additional Container Cluster RolesATTACK-T1098.007Additional Local or Domain GroupsATTACK-T1133External Remote ServicesATTACK-T1136Create AccountATTACK-T1136.001Local AccountATTACK-T1136.002Domain AccountATTACK-T1136.003Cloud AccountATTACK-T1137Office Application StartupATTACK-T1137.001Office Template MacrosATTACK-T1137.002Office TestATTACK-T1137.003Outlook FormsATTACK-T1137.004Outlook Home PageATTACK-T1137.005Outlook RulesATTACK-T1137.006Add-insATTACK-T1176Software ExtensionsATTACK-T1176.001Browser ExtensionsATTACK-T1176.002IDE ExtensionsATTACK-T1505Server Software ComponentATTACK-T1505.001SQL Stored ProceduresATTACK-T1505.002Transport AgentATTACK-T1505.003Web ShellATTACK-T1505.004IIS ComponentsATTACK-T1505.005Terminal Services DLLATTACK-T1505.006vSphere Installation BundlesATTACK-T1525Implant Internal ImageATTACK-T1542.001System FirmwareATTACK-T1542.002Component FirmwareATTACK-T1542.003BootkitATTACK-T1543Create or Modify System ProcessATTACK-T1543.001Launch AgentATTACK-T1543.002Systemd ServiceATTACK-T1543.003Windows ServiceATTACK-T1543.004Launch DaemonATTACK-T1543.005Container ServiceATTACK-T1546.017Udev RulesATTACK-T1546.018Python Startup HooksATTACK-T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionATTACK-T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderATTACK-T1547.002Authentication PackageATTACK-T1547.003Time ProvidersATTACK-T1547.004Winlogon Helper DLLATTACK-T1547.005Security Support ProviderATTACK-T1547.006Kernel Modules and ExtensionsATTACK-T1547.007Re-opened ApplicationsATTACK-T1547.008LSASS DriverATTACK-T1547.009Shortcut ModificationATTACK-T1547.010Port MonitorsATTACK-T1547.012Print ProcessorsATTACK-T1547.013XDG Autostart EntriesATTACK-T1547.014Active SetupATTACK-T1547.015Login ItemsATTACK-T1554Compromise Host Software BinaryATTACK-T1574Hijack Execution FlowATTACK-T1574.001DLLATTACK-T1574.004Dylib HijackingATTACK-T1574.005Executable Installer File Permissions WeaknessATTACK-T1574.006Dynamic Linker HijackingATTACK-T1574.007Path Interception by PATH Environment VariableATTACK-T1574.008Path Interception by Search Order HijackingATTACK-T1574.009Path Interception by Unquoted PathATTACK-T1574.010Services File Permissions WeaknessATTACK-T1574.011Services Registry Permissions WeaknessATTACK-T1574.012COR_PROFILERATTACK-T1574.013KernelCallbackTableATTACK-T1574.014AppDomainManagerATTACK-T1653Power SettingsATTACK-T1668Exclusive ControlATTACK-T1671Cloud Application Integration