Skip to main content
MuonPartners
Services
Architecture

Solution design and technology roadmapping

Solution AssessmentTechnology RoadmapsIntegration DesignSolution ArchitectureTechnical Design
Cyber Security

Security assessments, IAM, and compliance

AssessmentsIAMComplianceSecurity BaselineCyber Innovation
Network and Platform

Network architecture and cloud platforms

Network DesignCloud StrategyModernisation
Enterprise Architecture

Business-technology alignment

Business AlignmentPortfolio AnalysisGovernance
View all services
ProjectsCase StudiesInsightsToolsAbout
Contact Us

Services

Architecture
Solution AssessmentTechnology RoadmapsIntegration DesignSolution ArchitectureTechnical Design
Cyber Security
AssessmentsIAMComplianceSecurity BaselineCyber Innovation
Network and Platform
Network DesignCloud StrategyModernisation
Enterprise Architecture
Business AlignmentPortfolio AnalysisGovernance
ProjectsCase StudiesInsightsToolsAboutContact
Get in Touch
MuonPartners

Strategic technology consulting for Australian organisations navigating complexity.

Services

  • Architecture
  • Cyber Security
  • Network and Platform
  • Enterprise Architecture

Company

  • About
  • Products
  • Frameworks
  • Cross-Framework Mapping
  • Projects
  • Case Studies
  • Insights
  • Contact

Contact

  • [email protected]
  • Australia
  • LinkedIn

© 2026 Muon Partners. All rights reserved.

ABN 50 669 022 315 · A Muon Group company.

Privacy PolicyTerms of Service
  1. Frameworks
  2. >ATTACK
  3. >Persistence
  4. >ATTACK-T1547.008
ATTACK-T1547.008Active

LSASS Driver

Statement

Adversaries may modify or add LSASS drivers to obtain persistence on compromised systems. The Windows security subsystem is a set of components that manage and enforce the security policy for a computer or domain. The Local Security Authority (LSA) is the main component responsible for local security policy and user authentication. The LSA includes multiple dynamic link libraries (DLLs) associated with various other security functions, all of which run in the context of the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) lsass.exe process.(Citation: Microsoft Security Subsystem)

Adversaries may target LSASS drivers to obtain persistence. By either replacing or adding illegitimate drivers (e.g., Hijack Execution Flow), an adversary can use LSA operations to continuously execute malicious payloads.

Location

Tactic
Persistence

Technique Details

Identifier
ATTACK-T1547.008
Parent Technique
ATTACK-T1547
ATT&CK Page
View on MITRE

Tactics

PersistencePrivilege Escalation

Platforms

Windows

Detection

Detect unauthorized LSASS driver persistence via LSA plugin abuse (Windows)

Mitigations

Privileged Process Integrity: Privileged Process Integrity focuses on defending highly privileged processes (e.g., system services, antivirus, or authentication processes) from tampering, injection, or compromise by adversaries. These processes often interact with critical components, making them prime targets for techniques like code injection, privilege escalation, and process manipulation. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:

Protected Process Mechanisms:

  • Enable RunAsPPL on Windows systems to protect LSASS and other critical processes.
  • Use registry modifications to enforce protected process settings: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\RunAsPPL

Anti-Injection and Memory Protection:

  • Enable Control Flow Guard (CFG), DEP, and ASLR to protect against process memory tampering.
  • Deploy endpoint protection tools that actively block process injection attempts.

Code Signing Validation:

  • Implement policies for Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) or AppLocker to enforce execution of signed binaries.
  • Ensure critical processes are signed with valid certificates.

Access Controls:

  • Use DACLs and MIC to limit which users and processes can interact with privileged processes.
  • Disable unnecessary debugging capabilities for high-privileged processes.

Kernel-Level Protections:

  • Ensure Kernel Patch Protection (PatchGuard) is enabled on Windows systems.
  • Leverage SELinux or AppArmor on Linux to enforce kernel-level security policies.

Tools for Implementation

Protected Process Light (PPL):

  • RunAsPPL (Windows)
  • Windows Defender Credential Guard

Code Integrity and Signing:

  • Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC)
  • AppLocker
  • SELinux/AppArmor (Linux)

Memory Protection:

  • Control Flow Guard (CFG), Data Execution Prevention (DEP), ASLR

Process Isolation/Sandboxing:

  • Firejail (Linux Sandbox)
  • Windows Sandbox
  • QEMU/KVM-based isolation

Kernel Protection:

  • PatchGuard (Windows Kernel Patch Protection)
  • SELinux (Mandatory Access Control for Linux)
  • AppArmor

Credential Access Protection: Credential Access Protection focuses on implementing measures to prevent adversaries from obtaining credentials, such as passwords, hashes, tokens, or keys, that could be used for unauthorized access. This involves restricting access to credential storage mechanisms, hardening configurations to block credential dumping methods, and using monitoring tools to detect suspicious credential-related activity. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:

Restrict Access to Credential Storage:

  • Use Case: Prevent adversaries from accessing the SAM (Security Account Manager) database on Windows systems.
  • Implementation: Enforce least privilege principles and restrict administrative access to credential stores such as C:\Windows\System32\config\SAM.

Use Credential Guard:

  • Use Case: Isolate LSASS (Local Security Authority Subsystem Service) memory to prevent credential dumping.
  • Implementation: Enable Windows Defender Credential Guard on enterprise endpoints to isolate secrets and protect them from unauthorized access.

Monitor for Credential Dumping Tools:

  • Use Case: Detect and block known tools like Mimikatz or Windows Credential Editor.
  • Implementation: Flag suspicious process behavior related to credential dumping.

Disable Cached Credentials:

  • Use Case: Prevent adversaries from exploiting cached credentials on endpoints.
  • Implementation: Configure group policy to reduce or eliminate the use of cached credentials (e.g., set Interactive logon: Number of previous logons to cache to 0).

Enable Secure Boot and Memory Protections:

  • Use Case: Prevent memory-based attacks used to extract credentials.
  • Implementation: Configure Secure Boot and enforce hardware-based security features like DEP (Data Execution Prevention) and ASLR (Address Space Layout Randomization).

Restrict Library Loading: Restricting library loading involves implementing security controls to ensure that only trusted and verified libraries (DLLs, shared objects, etc.) are loaded into processes. Adversaries often abuse Dynamic-Link Library (DLL) Injection, DLL Search Order Hijacking, or LD_PRELOAD mechanisms to execute malicious code by forcing the operating system to load untrusted libraries. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:

Enforce Safe Library Loading Practices:

  • Enable SafeDLLSearchMode on Windows.
  • Restrict LD_PRELOAD and LD_LIBRARY_PATH usage on Linux systems.

Code Signing Enforcement:

  • Require digital signatures for all libraries loaded into processes.
  • Use tools like Signtool, and WDAC to enforce signed DLL execution.

Environment Hardening:

  • Secure library paths and directories to prevent adversaries from placing rogue libraries.
  • Monitor user-writable directories and system configurations for unauthorized changes.

Audit and Monitor Library Loading:

  • Enable Sysmon on Windows to monitor for suspicious library loads.
  • Use auditd on Linux to monitor shared library paths and configuration file changes.

Use Application Control Solutions:

  • Implement AppLocker, WDAC, or SELinux to allow only trusted libraries.

Tools for Implementation

Windows-Specific Tools:

  • AppLocker: Application whitelisting for DLLs.
  • Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC): Restrict unauthorized library execution.
  • Signtool: Verify and enforce code signing.
  • Sysmon: Monitor DLL load events (Event ID 7).

Linux-Specific Tools:

  • auditd: Monitor changes to library paths and critical files.
  • SELinux/AppArmor: Define policies to restrict library loading.
  • ldconfig and chattr: Secure LD configuration files and prevent unauthorized modifications.

Cross-Platform Solutions:

  • Wazuh or OSSEC: File integrity monitoring for library changes.
  • Tripwire: Detect and alert on unauthorized library modifications.
SP 800-53
SP800-53-CM-2relatedvia ctid-attack-to-sp800-53
SP800-53-CM-6relatedvia ctid-attack-to-sp800-53
SP800-53-RA-5relatedvia ctid-attack-to-sp800-53
SP800-53-SC-39relatedvia ctid-attack-to-sp800-53
SP800-53-SI-3relatedvia ctid-attack-to-sp800-53
View in graphReport an issue
← Back to Persistence
Persistence80 controls
ATTACK-T1037Boot or Logon Initialization ScriptsATTACK-T1037.001Logon Script (Windows)ATTACK-T1037.002Login HookATTACK-T1037.003Network Logon ScriptATTACK-T1037.004RC ScriptsATTACK-T1037.005Startup ItemsATTACK-T1098Account ManipulationATTACK-T1098.001Additional Cloud CredentialsATTACK-T1098.002Additional Email Delegate PermissionsATTACK-T1098.003Additional Cloud RolesATTACK-T1098.004SSH Authorized KeysATTACK-T1098.005Device RegistrationATTACK-T1098.006Additional Container Cluster RolesATTACK-T1098.007Additional Local or Domain GroupsATTACK-T1133External Remote ServicesATTACK-T1136Create AccountATTACK-T1136.001Local AccountATTACK-T1136.002Domain AccountATTACK-T1136.003Cloud AccountATTACK-T1137Office Application StartupATTACK-T1137.001Office Template MacrosATTACK-T1137.002Office TestATTACK-T1137.003Outlook FormsATTACK-T1137.004Outlook Home PageATTACK-T1137.005Outlook RulesATTACK-T1137.006Add-insATTACK-T1176Software ExtensionsATTACK-T1176.001Browser ExtensionsATTACK-T1176.002IDE ExtensionsATTACK-T1505Server Software ComponentATTACK-T1505.001SQL Stored ProceduresATTACK-T1505.002Transport AgentATTACK-T1505.003Web ShellATTACK-T1505.004IIS ComponentsATTACK-T1505.005Terminal Services DLLATTACK-T1505.006vSphere Installation BundlesATTACK-T1525Implant Internal ImageATTACK-T1542.001System FirmwareATTACK-T1542.002Component FirmwareATTACK-T1542.003BootkitATTACK-T1543Create or Modify System ProcessATTACK-T1543.001Launch AgentATTACK-T1543.002Systemd ServiceATTACK-T1543.003Windows ServiceATTACK-T1543.004Launch DaemonATTACK-T1543.005Container ServiceATTACK-T1546.017Udev RulesATTACK-T1546.018Python Startup HooksATTACK-T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionATTACK-T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderATTACK-T1547.002Authentication PackageATTACK-T1547.003Time ProvidersATTACK-T1547.004Winlogon Helper DLLATTACK-T1547.005Security Support ProviderATTACK-T1547.006Kernel Modules and ExtensionsATTACK-T1547.007Re-opened ApplicationsATTACK-T1547.008LSASS DriverATTACK-T1547.009Shortcut ModificationATTACK-T1547.010Port MonitorsATTACK-T1547.012Print ProcessorsATTACK-T1547.013XDG Autostart EntriesATTACK-T1547.014Active SetupATTACK-T1547.015Login ItemsATTACK-T1554Compromise Host Software BinaryATTACK-T1574Hijack Execution FlowATTACK-T1574.001DLLATTACK-T1574.004Dylib HijackingATTACK-T1574.005Executable Installer File Permissions WeaknessATTACK-T1574.006Dynamic Linker HijackingATTACK-T1574.007Path Interception by PATH Environment VariableATTACK-T1574.008Path Interception by Search Order HijackingATTACK-T1574.009Path Interception by Unquoted PathATTACK-T1574.010Services File Permissions WeaknessATTACK-T1574.011Services Registry Permissions WeaknessATTACK-T1574.012COR_PROFILERATTACK-T1574.013KernelCallbackTableATTACK-T1574.014AppDomainManagerATTACK-T1653Power SettingsATTACK-T1668Exclusive ControlATTACK-T1671Cloud Application Integration