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  1. Frameworks
  2. >ATTACK
  3. >Persistence
  4. >ATTACK-T1098.004
ATTACK-T1098.004Active

SSH Authorized Keys

Statement

Adversaries may modify the SSH <code>authorized_keys</code> file to maintain persistence on a victim host. Linux distributions, macOS, and ESXi hypervisors commonly use key-based authentication to secure the authentication process of SSH sessions for remote management. The <code>authorized_keys</code> file in SSH specifies the SSH keys that can be used for logging into the user account for which the file is configured. This file is usually found in the user's home directory under <code><user-home>/.ssh/authorized_keys</code> (or, on ESXi, /etc/ssh/keys-<username>/authorized_keys).(Citation: SSH Authorized Keys) Users may edit the system’s SSH config file to modify the directives PubkeyAuthentication and RSAAuthentication to the value yes to ensure public key and RSA authentication are enabled, as well as modify the directive PermitRootLogin to the value yes to enable root authentication via SSH.(Citation: Broadcom ESXi SSH) The SSH config file is usually located under <code>/etc/ssh/sshd_config</code>.

Adversaries may modify SSH <code>authorized_keys</code> files directly with scripts or shell commands to add their own adversary-supplied public keys. In cloud environments, adversaries may be able to modify the SSH authorized_keys file of a particular virtual machine via the command line interface or rest API. For example, by using the Google Cloud CLI’s “add-metadata” command an adversary may add SSH keys to a user account.(Citation: Google Cloud Add Metadata)(Citation: Google Cloud Privilege Escalation) Similarly, in Azure, an adversary may update the authorized_keys file of a virtual machine via a PATCH request to the API.(Citation: Azure Update Virtual Machines) This ensures that an adversary possessing the corresponding private key may log in as an existing user via SSH.(Citation: Venafi SSH Key Abuse)(Citation: Cybereason Linux Exim Worm) It may also lead to privilege escalation where the virtual machine or instance has distinct permissions from the requesting user.

Where authorized_keys files are modified via cloud APIs or command line interfaces, an adversary may achieve privilege escalation on the target virtual machine if they add a key to a higher-privileged user.

SSH keys can also be added to accounts on network devices, such as with the ip ssh pubkey-chain Network Device CLI command.(Citation: cisco_ip_ssh_pubkey_ch_cmd)

Location

Tactic
Persistence

Technique Details

Identifier
ATTACK-T1098.004
Parent Technique
ATTACK-T1098
ATT&CK Page
View on MITRE

Tactics

PersistencePrivilege Escalation

Platforms

LinuxmacOSIaaSNetwork DevicesESXi

Detection

Detection Strategy for SSH Key Injection in Authorized Keys

Mitigations

User Account Management: User Account Management involves implementing and enforcing policies for the lifecycle of user accounts, including creation, modification, and deactivation. Proper account management reduces the attack surface by limiting unauthorized access, managing account privileges, and ensuring accounts are used according to organizational policies. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:

Enforcing the Principle of Least Privilege

  • Implementation: Assign users only the minimum permissions required to perform their job functions. Regularly audit accounts to ensure no excess permissions are granted.
  • Use Case: Reduces the risk of privilege escalation by ensuring accounts cannot perform unauthorized actions.

Implementing Strong Password Policies

  • Implementation: Enforce password complexity requirements (e.g., length, character types). Require password expiration every 90 days and disallow password reuse.
  • Use Case: Prevents adversaries from gaining unauthorized access through password guessing or brute force attacks.

Managing Dormant and Orphaned Accounts

  • Implementation: Implement automated workflows to disable accounts after a set period of inactivity (e.g., 30 days). Remove orphaned accounts (e.g., accounts without an assigned owner) during regular account audits.
  • Use Case: Eliminates dormant accounts that could be exploited by attackers.

Account Lockout Policies

  • Implementation: Configure account lockout thresholds (e.g., lock accounts after five failed login attempts). Set lockout durations to a minimum of 15 minutes.
  • Use Case: Mitigates automated attack techniques that rely on repeated login attempts.

Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) for High-Risk Accounts

  • Implementation: Require MFA for all administrative accounts and high-risk users. Use MFA mechanisms like hardware tokens, authenticator apps, or biometrics.
  • Use Case: Prevents unauthorized access, even if credentials are stolen.

Restricting Interactive Logins

  • Implementation: Restrict interactive logins for privileged accounts to specific secure systems or management consoles. Use group policies to enforce logon restrictions.
  • Use Case: Protects sensitive accounts from misuse or exploitation.

Tools for Implementation

Built-in Tools:

  • Microsoft Active Directory (AD): Centralized account management and RBAC enforcement.
  • Group Policy Object (GPO): Enforce password policies, logon restrictions, and account lockout policies.

Identity and Access Management (IAM) Tools:

  • Okta: Centralized user provisioning, MFA, and SSO integration.
  • Microsoft Azure Active Directory: Provides advanced account lifecycle management, role-based access, and conditional access policies.

Privileged Account Management (PAM):

  • CyberArk, BeyondTrust, Thycotic: Manage and monitor privileged account usage, enforce session recording, and JIT access.

Restrict File and Directory Permissions: Restricting file and directory permissions involves setting access controls at the file system level to limit which users, groups, or processes can read, write, or execute files. By configuring permissions appropriately, organizations can reduce the attack surface for adversaries seeking to access sensitive data, plant malicious code, or tamper with system files.

Enforce Least Privilege Permissions:

  • Remove unnecessary write permissions on sensitive files and directories.
  • Use file ownership and groups to control access for specific roles.

Example (Windows): Right-click the shared folder → Properties → Security tab → Adjust permissions for NTFS ACLs.

Harden File Shares:

  • Disable anonymous access to shared folders.
  • Enforce NTFS permissions for shared folders on Windows.

Example: Set permissions to restrict write access to critical files, such as system executables (e.g., /bin or /sbin on Linux). Use tools like chown and chmod to assign file ownership and limit access.

On Linux, apply: chmod 750 /etc/sensitive.conf chown root:admin /etc/sensitive.conf

File Integrity Monitoring (FIM):

  • Use tools like Tripwire, Wazuh, or OSSEC to monitor changes to critical file permissions.

Audit File System Access:

  • Enable auditing to track permission changes or unauthorized access attempts.
  • Use auditd (Linux) or Event Viewer (Windows) to log activities.

Restrict Startup Directories:

  • Configure permissions to prevent unauthorized writes to directories like C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu.

Example: Restrict write access to critical directories like /etc/, /usr/local/, and Windows directories such as C:\Windows\System32.

  • On Windows, use icacls to modify permissions: icacls "C:\Windows\System32" /inheritance:r /grant:r SYSTEM:(OI)(CI)F
  • On Linux, monitor permissions using tools like lsattr or auditd.

Disable or Remove Feature or Program: Disable or remove unnecessary and potentially vulnerable software, features, or services to reduce the attack surface and prevent abuse by adversaries. This involves identifying software or features that are no longer needed or that could be exploited and ensuring they are either removed or properly disabled. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:

Remove Legacy Software:

  • Use Case: Disable or remove older versions of software that no longer receive updates or security patches (e.g., legacy Java, Adobe Flash).
  • Implementation: A company removes Flash Player from all employee systems after it has reached its end-of-life date.

Disable Unused Features:

  • Use Case: Turn off unnecessary operating system features like SMBv1, Telnet, or RDP if they are not required.
  • Implementation: Disable SMBv1 in a Windows environment to mitigate vulnerabilities like EternalBlue.

Control Applications Installed by Users:

  • Use Case: Prevent users from installing unauthorized software via group policies or other management tools.
  • Implementation: Block user installations of unauthorized file-sharing applications (e.g., BitTorrent clients) in an enterprise environment.

Remove Unnecessary Services:

  • Use Case: Identify and disable unnecessary default services running on endpoints, servers, or network devices.
  • Implementation: Disable unused administrative shares (e.g., C$, ADMIN$) on workstations.

Restrict Add-ons and Plugins:

  • Use Case: Remove or disable browser plugins and add-ons that are not needed for business purposes.
  • Implementation: Disable Java and ActiveX plugins in web browsers to prevent drive-by attacks.
SP 800-53
SP800-53-AC-20relatedvia ctid-attack-to-sp800-53
SP800-53-AC-3relatedvia ctid-attack-to-sp800-53
SP800-53-AC-5relatedvia ctid-attack-to-sp800-53
SP800-53-AC-6relatedvia ctid-attack-to-sp800-53
SP800-53-CM-2relatedvia ctid-attack-to-sp800-53
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Persistence80 controls
ATTACK-T1037Boot or Logon Initialization ScriptsATTACK-T1037.001Logon Script (Windows)ATTACK-T1037.002Login HookATTACK-T1037.003Network Logon ScriptATTACK-T1037.004RC ScriptsATTACK-T1037.005Startup ItemsATTACK-T1098Account ManipulationATTACK-T1098.001Additional Cloud CredentialsATTACK-T1098.002Additional Email Delegate PermissionsATTACK-T1098.003Additional Cloud RolesATTACK-T1098.004SSH Authorized KeysATTACK-T1098.005Device RegistrationATTACK-T1098.006Additional Container Cluster RolesATTACK-T1098.007Additional Local or Domain GroupsATTACK-T1133External Remote ServicesATTACK-T1136Create AccountATTACK-T1136.001Local AccountATTACK-T1136.002Domain AccountATTACK-T1136.003Cloud AccountATTACK-T1137Office Application StartupATTACK-T1137.001Office Template MacrosATTACK-T1137.002Office TestATTACK-T1137.003Outlook FormsATTACK-T1137.004Outlook Home PageATTACK-T1137.005Outlook RulesATTACK-T1137.006Add-insATTACK-T1176Software ExtensionsATTACK-T1176.001Browser ExtensionsATTACK-T1176.002IDE ExtensionsATTACK-T1505Server Software ComponentATTACK-T1505.001SQL Stored ProceduresATTACK-T1505.002Transport AgentATTACK-T1505.003Web ShellATTACK-T1505.004IIS ComponentsATTACK-T1505.005Terminal Services DLLATTACK-T1505.006vSphere Installation BundlesATTACK-T1525Implant Internal ImageATTACK-T1542.001System FirmwareATTACK-T1542.002Component FirmwareATTACK-T1542.003BootkitATTACK-T1543Create or Modify System ProcessATTACK-T1543.001Launch AgentATTACK-T1543.002Systemd ServiceATTACK-T1543.003Windows ServiceATTACK-T1543.004Launch DaemonATTACK-T1543.005Container ServiceATTACK-T1546.017Udev RulesATTACK-T1546.018Python Startup HooksATTACK-T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionATTACK-T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderATTACK-T1547.002Authentication PackageATTACK-T1547.003Time ProvidersATTACK-T1547.004Winlogon Helper DLLATTACK-T1547.005Security Support ProviderATTACK-T1547.006Kernel Modules and ExtensionsATTACK-T1547.007Re-opened ApplicationsATTACK-T1547.008LSASS DriverATTACK-T1547.009Shortcut ModificationATTACK-T1547.010Port MonitorsATTACK-T1547.012Print ProcessorsATTACK-T1547.013XDG Autostart EntriesATTACK-T1547.014Active SetupATTACK-T1547.015Login ItemsATTACK-T1554Compromise Host Software BinaryATTACK-T1574Hijack Execution FlowATTACK-T1574.001DLLATTACK-T1574.004Dylib HijackingATTACK-T1574.005Executable Installer File Permissions WeaknessATTACK-T1574.006Dynamic Linker HijackingATTACK-T1574.007Path Interception by PATH Environment VariableATTACK-T1574.008Path Interception by Search Order HijackingATTACK-T1574.009Path Interception by Unquoted PathATTACK-T1574.010Services File Permissions WeaknessATTACK-T1574.011Services Registry Permissions WeaknessATTACK-T1574.012COR_PROFILERATTACK-T1574.013KernelCallbackTableATTACK-T1574.014AppDomainManagerATTACK-T1653Power SettingsATTACK-T1668Exclusive ControlATTACK-T1671Cloud Application Integration