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  1. Frameworks
  2. >ATTACK
  3. >Persistence
  4. >ATTACK-T1554
ATTACK-T1554Active

Compromise Host Software Binary

Statement

Adversaries may modify host software binaries to establish persistent access to systems. Software binaries/executables provide a wide range of system commands or services, programs, and libraries. Common software binaries are SSH clients, FTP clients, email clients, web browsers, and many other user or server applications.

Adversaries may establish persistence though modifications to host software binaries. For example, an adversary may replace or otherwise infect a legitimate application binary (or support files) with a backdoor. Since these binaries may be routinely executed by applications or the user, the adversary can leverage this for persistent access to the host. An adversary may also modify a software binary such as an SSH client in order to persistently collect credentials during logins (i.e., Modify Authentication Process).(Citation: Google Cloud Mandiant UNC3886 2024)

An adversary may also modify an existing binary by patching in malicious functionality (e.g., IAT Hooking/Entry point patching)(Citation: Unit42 Banking Trojans Hooking 2022) prior to the binary’s legitimate execution. For example, an adversary may modify the entry point of a binary to point to malicious code patched in by the adversary before resuming normal execution flow.(Citation: ESET FontOnLake Analysis 2021)

After modifying a binary, an adversary may attempt to Impair Defenses by preventing it from updating (e.g., via the yum-versionlock command or versionlock.list file in Linux systems that use the yum package manager).(Citation: Google Cloud Mandiant UNC3886 2024)

Location

Tactic
Persistence

Technique Details

Identifier
ATTACK-T1554
ATT&CK Page
View on MITRE

Tactics

Persistence

Platforms

LinuxmacOSWindowsESXi

Detection

Detect Compromise of Host Software Binaries

Mitigations

Code Signing: Code Signing is a security process that ensures the authenticity and integrity of software by digitally signing executables, scripts, and other code artifacts. It prevents untrusted or malicious code from executing by verifying the digital signatures against trusted sources. Code signing protects against tampering, impersonation, and distribution of unauthorized or malicious software, forming a critical defense against supply chain and software exploitation attacks. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:

Enforce Signed Code Execution:

  • Implementation: Configure operating systems (e.g., Windows with AppLocker or Linux with Secure Boot) to allow only signed code to execute.
  • Use Case: Prevent the execution of malicious PowerShell scripts by requiring all scripts to be signed with a trusted certificate.

Vendor-Signed Driver Enforcement:

  • Implementation: Enable kernel-mode code signing to ensure that only drivers signed by trusted vendors can be loaded.
  • Use Case: A malicious driver attempting to modify system memory fails to load because it lacks a valid signature.

Certificate Revocation Management:

  • Implementation: Use Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) or Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) to block certificates associated with compromised or deprecated code.
  • Use Case: A compromised certificate used to sign a malicious update is revoked, preventing further execution of the software.

Third-Party Software Verification:

  • Implementation: Require software from external vendors to be signed with valid certificates before deployment.
  • Use Case: An organization only deploys signed and verified third-party software to prevent supply chain attacks.

Script Integrity in CI/CD Pipelines:

  • Implementation: Integrate code signing into CI/CD pipelines to sign and verify code artifacts before production release.
  • Use Case: A software company ensures that all production builds are signed, preventing tampered builds from reaching customers.

Key Components of Code Signing

  • Digital Signature Verification: Verifies the authenticity of code by ensuring it was signed by a trusted entity.
  • Certificate Management: Uses Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) to manage signing certificates and revocation lists.
  • Enforced Policy for Unsigned Code: Prevents the execution of unsigned or untrusted binaries and scripts.
  • Hash Integrity Check: Confirms that code has not been altered since signing by comparing cryptographic hashes.
SP 800-53
SP800-53-CA-8relatedvia ctid-attack-to-sp800-53
SP800-53-CM-2relatedvia ctid-attack-to-sp800-53
SP800-53-CM-6relatedvia ctid-attack-to-sp800-53
SP800-53-IA-9relatedvia ctid-attack-to-sp800-53
SP800-53-SI-7relatedvia ctid-attack-to-sp800-53
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Persistence80 controls
ATTACK-T1037Boot or Logon Initialization ScriptsATTACK-T1037.001Logon Script (Windows)ATTACK-T1037.002Login HookATTACK-T1037.003Network Logon ScriptATTACK-T1037.004RC ScriptsATTACK-T1037.005Startup ItemsATTACK-T1098Account ManipulationATTACK-T1098.001Additional Cloud CredentialsATTACK-T1098.002Additional Email Delegate PermissionsATTACK-T1098.003Additional Cloud RolesATTACK-T1098.004SSH Authorized KeysATTACK-T1098.005Device RegistrationATTACK-T1098.006Additional Container Cluster RolesATTACK-T1098.007Additional Local or Domain GroupsATTACK-T1133External Remote ServicesATTACK-T1136Create AccountATTACK-T1136.001Local AccountATTACK-T1136.002Domain AccountATTACK-T1136.003Cloud AccountATTACK-T1137Office Application StartupATTACK-T1137.001Office Template MacrosATTACK-T1137.002Office TestATTACK-T1137.003Outlook FormsATTACK-T1137.004Outlook Home PageATTACK-T1137.005Outlook RulesATTACK-T1137.006Add-insATTACK-T1176Software ExtensionsATTACK-T1176.001Browser ExtensionsATTACK-T1176.002IDE ExtensionsATTACK-T1505Server Software ComponentATTACK-T1505.001SQL Stored ProceduresATTACK-T1505.002Transport AgentATTACK-T1505.003Web ShellATTACK-T1505.004IIS ComponentsATTACK-T1505.005Terminal Services DLLATTACK-T1505.006vSphere Installation BundlesATTACK-T1525Implant Internal ImageATTACK-T1542.001System FirmwareATTACK-T1542.002Component FirmwareATTACK-T1542.003BootkitATTACK-T1543Create or Modify System ProcessATTACK-T1543.001Launch AgentATTACK-T1543.002Systemd ServiceATTACK-T1543.003Windows ServiceATTACK-T1543.004Launch DaemonATTACK-T1543.005Container ServiceATTACK-T1546.017Udev RulesATTACK-T1546.018Python Startup HooksATTACK-T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionATTACK-T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderATTACK-T1547.002Authentication PackageATTACK-T1547.003Time ProvidersATTACK-T1547.004Winlogon Helper DLLATTACK-T1547.005Security Support ProviderATTACK-T1547.006Kernel Modules and ExtensionsATTACK-T1547.007Re-opened ApplicationsATTACK-T1547.008LSASS DriverATTACK-T1547.009Shortcut ModificationATTACK-T1547.010Port MonitorsATTACK-T1547.012Print ProcessorsATTACK-T1547.013XDG Autostart EntriesATTACK-T1547.014Active SetupATTACK-T1547.015Login ItemsATTACK-T1554Compromise Host Software BinaryATTACK-T1574Hijack Execution FlowATTACK-T1574.001DLLATTACK-T1574.004Dylib HijackingATTACK-T1574.005Executable Installer File Permissions WeaknessATTACK-T1574.006Dynamic Linker HijackingATTACK-T1574.007Path Interception by PATH Environment VariableATTACK-T1574.008Path Interception by Search Order HijackingATTACK-T1574.009Path Interception by Unquoted PathATTACK-T1574.010Services File Permissions WeaknessATTACK-T1574.011Services Registry Permissions WeaknessATTACK-T1574.012COR_PROFILERATTACK-T1574.013KernelCallbackTableATTACK-T1574.014AppDomainManagerATTACK-T1653Power SettingsATTACK-T1668Exclusive ControlATTACK-T1671Cloud Application Integration